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Research Article
Bayesian models have become popular means of explain-
ing behavior in a number of psychological domains. 
These behaviors range from how people judge basic per-
ceptual features, such as motion, shape, orientation, and 
depth (Adams & Mamassian, 2004; Burge, Fowlkes, & 
Banks, 2010; Girshick, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2011; Weiss, 
Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002), to the cognitive and motor 
decisions people make following perceptual processing 
(Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 
2008). Bayesian models are based on the assumption that 
perceptual and cognitive choices arise from a statistically 
optimal combination of noisy incoming evidence and 
prior knowledge (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 
2004; Vilares & Kording, 2011). They formalize an intui-
tive central tenet: As evidence becomes less reliable, peo-
ple are increasingly influenced by prior expectations. 
This simple idea explains why visual stimulation under 
ambiguous conditions can lead to perceptual illusions 
and biases (e.g., Powell, Bompas, & Sumner, 2012) and 
why linguistic probabilities influence the interpretation of 
ambiguous sentences (Chater & Manning, 2006). Bayesian 
frameworks have also been used to explain features of 
clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD; Pellicano & Burr, 2012), schizophrenia (Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009; Teufel et al., 2015), and anxiety and depres-
sion (Paulus & Yu, 2012). Given that these disorders lie 
on spectra that extend to the general population (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001), Bayesian models may also capture more fine-grained 
differences across people in a systematic fashion. We there-
fore investigated whether individual differences in per-
ceived motion are determined by predictable differences in 
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Abstract
According to Bayesian models, perception and cognition depend on the optimal combination of noisy incoming 
evidence with prior knowledge of the world. Individual differences in perception should therefore be jointly determined 
by a person’s sensitivity to incoming evidence and his or her prior expectations. It has been proposed that individuals 
with autism have flatter prior distributions than do nonautistic individuals, which suggests that prior variance is 
linked to the degree of autistic traits in the general population. We tested this idea by studying how perceived speed 
changes during pursuit eye movement and at low contrast. We found that individual differences in these two motion 
phenomena were predicted by differences in thresholds and autistic traits when combined in a quantitative Bayesian 
model. Our findings therefore support the flatter-prior hypothesis and suggest that individual differences in prior 
expectations are more systematic than previously thought. In order to be revealed, however, individual differences in 
sensitivity must also be taken into account.
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prior expectation once differences in sensory sensitivity 
have been taken into account. To do this, we tested a 
quantitative model inspired by Pellicano and Burr’s 
(2012) Bayesian explanation of autism.
In Experiment 1, we investigated the lowering of 
perceived speed during pursuit eye movements (the 
Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon), and in Experiment 2, we 
investigated the lowering of perceived speed as contrast 
is reduced (Thompson, 1982). In Bayesian models of 
phenomena such as these, likelihood functions and prob-
ability distributions are used to encapsulate noisy sen-
sory evidence and prior expectations, respectively. For 
motion, the prior for speed peaks at zero, which reflects 
the fact that most objects are at rest or move slowly 
(Weiss et al., 2002). Likelihood and prior are multiplied 
together to yield a posterior distribution, the average of 
which forms the basis of perceptual judgments, such as 
estimating speed (Fig. 1, left- and right-hand panels). As 
sensory evidence becomes less reliable, the likelihood 
distribution spreads out, which shifts the posterior distri-
bution toward the prior and lowers the speed estimate. 
Low-contrast stimuli therefore appear to move more 
slowly, because reducing the contrast makes the sensory 
evidence less reliable, which allows the prior to dominate 
the estimate of speed (Hürlimann, Kiper, & Carandini, 
2002; Sotiropoulos, Seitz, & Seriès, 2014; Stocker & 
Simoncelli, 2006, although see Hassan & Hammett, 2015). 
Similarly, in the case of the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon, 
pursuit eye movements lower the reliability of sensory 
evidence, which causes motion thresholds to increase 
along with a corresponding slowing of perceived speed 
(Freeman, Champion, & Warren, 2010).
Two ways to manipulate sensory noise within an indi-
vidual are by changing the contrast of a stimulus and 
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the Bayes model of speed perception. The central panel shows how the variance of the prior distribution and the sensory 
evidence influence perceived speed (mean of the posterior distribution, color-coded from 0 to stimulus speed V). The surrounding panels depict 
specific examples of how these contours were derived; each contour corresponds to an observer (identified by symbols in the central panel) 
with a particular combination of prior variance and level of sensory evidence. The top two panels have the same (flatter) prior but the sensory 
evidence (likelihood) becomes less reliable from left to right; the bottom two panels have the same sharper priors. In each case, the statistically 
optimal best guess is based on multiplying the sensory evidence (likelihood function) with the prior distribution to yield the posterior distribution. 
As the sensory evidence gets less reliable (cf. left and right panels), the location of the posterior distribution shifts toward the prior distribution, 
so perceived speed goes down. Similarly, as the prior distribution becomes flatter (cf. bottom and top panels on each side), the location of the 
posterior distribution shifts toward the sensory evidence, so perceived speed goes up. The general relationship between the location (mean) of 
the posterior and the variance of prior distribution and sensory evidence is shown in the central panel. Assuming distributions are Gaussian, that 
observers are unbiased (i.e., their likelihood mean equals stimulus speed V, as shown in the lower-left panel), and that the prior is centered on 
zero, then the posterior’s location is determined by the ratio of the variances. This is shown as color-coded iso-mean contours. Each contour 
therefore defines a line of constant perceived speed.
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inducing eye movements. But noise can also vary across 
individuals, which implies that the reliability of sensory 
evidence also differs from person to person. This leads to 
differences in psychophysical thresholds, some of which 
have recently been related to changes in structural, neu-
ropharmacological, and electrophysiological factors 
(Edden, Muthukumaraswamy, Freeman, & Singh, 2009; 
Song, Schwarzkopf, Kanai, & Rees, 2015). At the same 
time, priors are also known to vary between people 
(Adams, 2007). In particular, the shapes of priors for 
speed seem to be unique to individuals when reverse-
engineered from psychophysical data (Sotiropoulos 
et al., 2014; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). Yet reasons why 
priors differ across individuals have received less atten-
tion than reasons why the reliability of sensory evidence 
might change.
We therefore investigated whether individual differ-
ences in motion priors are more systematic than previ-
ously thought. We did this by testing a model designed to 
account for a particular aspect of the shape of the prior, 
namely its variance. The model was based on the ideas 
of Pellicano and Burr (2012), who suggested that priors 
are flatter in individuals with ASD than in individuals 
without ASD. The flatter-prior hypothesis could explain a 
number of features of autism, such as resistance to cer-
tain visual illusions (see Dakin & Frith, 2005; Simmons 
et al., 2009), sensory overload, and insistence on same-
ness. Initial support for the flatter-prior hypothesis comes 
from Skewes, Jegindø, and Gebauer (2015), who found 
that a group scoring high on an autism-trait questionnaire 
was less able to learn short-term prior information than a 
group scoring lower on the same questionnaire when the 
proportion of visual targets embedded in a detection task 
was manipulated. Similarly, Zaidel, Goin-Kochel, and 
Angelaki (2015) found that individuals with ASD failed to 
learn changes in stimulus reliability when noise was 
added to visual motion in a task in which observers 
judged the direction of their self-motion. From a compu-
tational standpoint, Rosenberg, Patterson, and Angelaki 
(2015) have shown how changes to divisive normaliza-
tion in populations of neurons could lead to flatter priors 
in autism.
If the shapes of priors vary as a function of the degree 
of autistic traits in the general population, then demon-
strating a relationship between prior distributions and the 
experience of illusions would be difficult because the 
reliability of sensory evidence could also differ across 
individuals. This is demonstrated in the central panel of 
Figure 1, where the color-coded contours define the 
position of the posterior distribution from which percep-
tual estimates arise. According to the Bayesian frame-
work, any two individuals on a contour (e.g., those 
represented in Fig. 1 by an open circle and a filled square) 
should make identical perceptual judgments despite very 
different priors and likelihoods. In comparison, individu-
als who differ in only their prior or likelihood (e.g., cir-
cles and squares; open and filled symbols) should make 
different perceptual judgments. It is therefore impossible 
to predict individual differences in dimensions such as 
perceived speed by examining only differences in prior 
or sensitivity: Both must be taken into account.
To investigate whether Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) flat-
ter-prior hypothesis can account for individual differences 
in motion perception, we therefore incorporated an 
autism-trait measure into a formal Bayesian model. Cru-
cially, the model also included threshold data to encapsu-
late the reliability of sensory evidence. We then used the 
model to predict individual differences in the strength of 
the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon (Experiment 1) and the 
contrast effect (Experiment 2), comparing the results to 
changes in perceived speed measured in the lab.
Method
Experiment 1
Stimuli and materials. The Aubert-Fleischl phenom-
enon was investigated using a two-alternative forced-
choice technique consisting of two moving stimuli (A 
and B) combined in three different ways to create three 
different trial types (A-A, B-B, and A-B). Stimulus A was 
a patch of randomly positioned dots (0.64 dots/deg2, dot 
diameter = 0.1°) that moved across the screen relative to 
a stationary fixation point, and stimulus B was a moving 
patch that observers followed across the screen with a 
smooth-pursuit eye movement. Each stimulus was shown 
for a randomly selected duration between 1.15 and 1.35 
s and was preceded by a solitary stationary fixation point 
presented for 0.5 s (see Fig. 2a for an example of an A-B 
trial sequence). The random dot patterns were displayed 
through an annulus window (inner diameter = 2°, outer 
diameter = 10°) whose motion was yoked to the motion 
of the central fixation point. For stimulus A, the dot pat-
tern therefore appeared to move as a rigid sheet behind 
a static annulus window. For stimulus B, the dots, annu-
lus window, and fixation point all moved at the same 
velocity. Stimulus motion was always horizontal, with 
direction (left vs. right) chosen at random on each trial.
Stimuli were viewed on a ViewSonic P225f monitor at 
a frame rate of 100 Hz in a completely darkened lab at a 
distance of 70 cm. Eye movements were recorded using 
an EyeLink 1000 video-based eye tracker (SR Research, 
Kanata, Ontario, Canada) that sampled eye position at a 
rate of 1000 Hz. Autistic traits were measured with the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001). The questionnaire consists of 50 questions, 
and scores range from 0 (no autistic traits) to 50 (high 
level of autistic traits).
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Procedure. Two of the three different stimulus combi-
nations (A-A and B-B) were used to measure speed- 
discrimination thresholds for fixated stimuli and pursued 
stimuli, respectively. The third combination (A-B) was 
used to measure the strength of the Aubert-Fleischl phe-
nomenon, namely, the perceived speed difference 
between fixated stimuli and pursued stimuli. In discrimi-
nation trials, one of the stimuli was designated as the 
standard and had a fixed speed of 8° per second. For the 
Aubert-Fleischl trials, the pursued stimulus was desig-
nated as the standard and moved at a speed, VB, of 8° per 
second. Psychometric functions for all trial types were 
then obtained by manipulating the speed of the other 
stimulus (i.e., the test stimulus) across trials, according to 
a method of constant stimuli. Observers had to choose 
which of the two stimuli appeared to move faster. No 
feedback was given. The order of test and standard stim-
uli was randomized across trials.
Test stimuli were shown at seven speeds equally 
spaced 1.33° per second apart. Stimuli were shown at 
each speed 10 times for each trial type, which yielded 
210 trials per observer. The speeds ranged from 4 to 12° 
per second for discrimination trials and 0 to 8° per sec-
ond for Aubert-Fleischl trials. Both stimulus A and stimu-
lus B were shown for approximately 1.25 s (SD = 0.1 s), 
with blank intervals of 0.5 s between them. All speeds 
and trial types were randomly intermixed within each 
testing session.
The autism-trait questionnaire was completed follow-
ing the psychophysics measurements. Testing sessions 
lasted for about 30 min. Prior to data collection, the eye 
tracker was calibrated for each observer using standard 
procedures.
Data analysis
Psychophysics measurements. Dependent measures 
were obtained by fitting psychometric functions (cumu-
lative Gaussians) to the appropriate subset of trials using 
probit analysis (examples can be found in Fig. S1 of the 
Supplemental Material available online). For A-B trials, 
the strength of the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon was 
defined as the speed at which the test stimulus was cho-
sen 50% of the time (i.e., the point of subjective equality, 
or PSE). The PSE therefore corresponded to the speed 
of the dots viewed with stationary fixation (VA) that pro-
duced a perceived-speed match to the pursued stimuli. 
For convenience (and in keeping with the formal model 
derivation shown in the Supplemental Material), we 
express the PSE as the ratio VA/VB (i.e., PSE/standard 
speed). Assuming that pursued dots appear slower to the 
observer, then the ratio would be less than 1. Thresholds 
for A-A and B-B discrimination trials were defined as the 
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Fig. 2. Example stimulus sequences used to assess (a) the strength of the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon (Experiment 1) 
and (b) the size of the contrast effect (Experiment 2). In each trial of Experiment 1, participants viewed two sequentially 
presented random dot patterns, each of which moved inside an annulus window (indicated here with dotted lines that 
did not appear in the actual stimulus display). In fixation displays (in which the fixation point and annulus window were 
stationary), the dots appeared to move as a rigid sheet within the window, whereas in pursuit displays, the dots, window, 
and fixation point all moved together horizontally at the same velocity across the screen. The order of stimulus presenta-
tion and direction of stimulus movement was randomized across trials. In each trial of Experiment 2, participants viewed 
two vertically moving gratings presented simultaneously; both gratings were the same except that one was high contrast 
and one was low contrast. Movement direction (up vs. down) was chosen randomly on each trial. In both experiments, 
observers had to choose which of the two stimuli appeared to move faster.
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standard deviation of the best-fitting cumulative Gauss-
ian function. This is equivalent to the speed difference 
between the 84.1% point and the PSE.
Eye movements. The accuracy of smooth pursuit was 
assessed using the mean eye speed across all stimulus-B 
presentations, regardless of trial type. This was converted 
into a gain measure by dividing by the standard speed 
(VB = 8°/s). Fixation accuracy was assessed using mean 
eye speed across all stimulus-A presentations, again 
regardless of trial type. All speed measures were based 
on the temporal derivative of smoothed positioned sam-
ples (Gaussian filter, SD = 16 Hz) with blinks, dropouts, 
and saccades removed using standard procedures.
Observers. All observers gave informed consent, and 
the experimental procedures were approved by the 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University Ethics Commit-
tee. Observers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Thirty-seven undergraduate students participated for 
course credit or payment (1 additional observer was 
unable to complete testing). One observer was excluded 
from the analysis because her responses in the Aubert-
Fleischl trials did not exceed 50% correct (i.e., the PSE) 
regardless of stimulus speed. Four observers were 
removed because they failed to obey the eye movement 
instructions (2 moved their eyes substantially in the fixa-
tion intervals, with a mean velocity > 2°/s; 2 did not pur-
sue properly, with a mean pursuit gain < 0.6). An 
additional 2 observers were excluded because of techni-
cal problems with the eye movement recordings (> 50% 
samples were lost because of eyeblinks and dropouts). 
This left a cohort of 31 observers (17 male, 14 female), 
with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD = 1.7). Our sample size 
was based on previous work in this area. The final sam-
ple was larger than the samples in the majority of the 
studies on individual differences cited in this article.
Experiment 2
Stimuli and materials. The contrast effect and associ-
ated discrimination thresholds were investigated using a 
technique similar to that used in Experiment 1. Stimulus 
A was defined as a moving luminance grating (1 cycle 
per degree) shown at a high contrast (64%) through a 
circular window (diameter = 4°). Stimulus B was an iden-
tical grating displayed at a lower contrast (8%; see Fig. 2b 
for an example A-B trial sequence). Stimuli were dis-
played for 0.3 s and preceded by a stationary central fixa-
tion point displayed for 0.5 s. Unlike in Experiment 1, 
stimuli were shown simultaneously, and the motion was 
always vertical. The stimuli were positioned 4° to either 
side of the central fixation point, and direction (up vs. 
down) was chosen at random on each trial. Stimuli were 
viewed on a Sony Trinitron CPD-G400 monitor at a frame 
rate of 85 Hz in a completely darkened lab at a viewing 
distance of 57 cm. The mean luminance was 44.5 cd/m2, 
and the display was gamma corrected. Autistic traits were 
measured as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. For discrimination trials (A-A and B-B), the 
standard stimulus moved at a speed of 2° per second. For 
contrast-effect trials (A-B, as shown in Fig. 2b), the high-
contrast stimulus was designated as the standard and 
moved at a speed, VA, of 2° per second. The standard was 
randomly selected to appear either on the left or the right 
of the screen. Psychometric functions for all three trial types 
were obtained using test speeds equally spaced 1° per 
second apart. Stimuli were shown at each speed 10 times 
for each trial type, which yielded 270 trials per observer. 
The speeds ranged from 1 to 4° per second for all trial 
types. As in Experiment 1, all speeds and trial types were 
randomly intermixed within each testing session.
Data analysis. The strength of the contrast effect and 
discrimination thresholds for high- and low-contrast stim-
uli were obtained using the same methods as Experiment 
1. The only difference was that the standard was now 
defined as stimulus A. Hence the ratio VA/VB for the con-
trast effect corresponded to the speed of the standard 
stimulus divided by the PSE. Assuming that lower- contrast 
gratings appear slower, this ratio will be less than 1.
Observers. Twenty-eight undergraduate participated for 
course credit or payment. One observer was excluded 
from the analysis because her responses in the contrast-
effect trials did not exceed 50% correct regardless of stim-
ulus speed. Another was excluded because her PSE for 
the contrast effect was 15 standard deviations above the 
mean. This left a cohort of 26 observers (9 male, 17 
female), with a mean age of 21.8 years (SD = 3.0). As in 
Experiment 1, our sample size was based on previous 
work in this area. The sample size in Experiment 2 was 
somewhere in the middle of the sample sizes in the 
majority of the studies on individual differences cited in 
this article.
Model and analysis
The algebraic derivation of the model is described more 
fully in the Supplemental Material. The model is based 
on the assumption of an unbiased observer (i.e., mean of 
sensory evidence equals stimulus speed) and a slow-
motion prior (i.e., peak of the prior is 0), both common 
practice in the motion literature. The model is based on 
three assumptions: (a) The variance of the sensory evi-
dence is fixed with respect to stimulus speed; (b) the esti-
mates of speed for pursued and fixated dot patches share 
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a common prior, as do those for high- and low-contrast 
gratings; and (c) the prior’s variance is linearly related to 
the autism-trait measure by a single scaling factor. These 
three assumptions are justified as follows. The fixed-noise 
assumption suffices for the small range of speeds that our 
method probed; it is equivalent to the near-universal 
practice of fitting a single cumulative Gaussian function 
to psychophysical data in order to obtain the psychomet-
ric function. The common prior assumption in the case of 
the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon is based on the idea 
that the knowledge to be encapsulated by the prior con-
cerns the motion of objects in the world, not pursuit or 
fixation (Freeman et al., 2010); this idea also applies to 
stimuli displayed at different contrasts (whether the same 
prior is used across all motion tasks is beyond the scope 
of the current article). Finally, the assumption that the 
variance of the prior is linearly related to the autism trait 
was, in effect, tested in our experiments.
To model individual differences in the strength of the 
Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon or the contrast effect, we 
combined the preceding assumptions with standard 
Bayesian formulae and signal detection theory. This 
yielded the following equation (see the Supplemental 
Material for the derivation):
V
V
kQ
kQ
A
B
A
B
=
+ ∆
+ ∆
2
2
2
2
/
/ .
The ratio VA/VB defines the size of the Aubert-Fleischl 
phenomenon (Experiment 1) or contrast effect (Experi-
ment 2); ∆2A is the squared threshold for fixated or high-
contrast stimuli, and ∆2B is the squared threshold for 
pursued or low-contrast stimuli; Q is the autism quotient; 
and k is the linear scaling factor. Note that the addition of 
prior and likelihood variances in the above equation (i.e., 
kQ + ∆2 /2) should not be confused with the multiplica-
tion of prior distributions with likelihood functions. It is 
the latter that lies at the core of the derivation.
To investigate the model, we determined the single 
value of k that minimized the squared error between the 
actual size of the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon or con-
trast effect and those predicted by the model using the 
above equation. There was therefore a single value of k 
per cohort of observers. We then compared the goodness 
of fit of the Bayes model to two reduced and non-Bayes-
ian versions. The first ignored the sensory evidence and 
included the prior only, using the best-fitting value of k 
obtained from the autism quotient without the thresholds 
(i.e., VA/VB = kQ). The second model, based on the ratio 
of the squared thresholds alone, ignored the prior and 
used only the sensory evidence. For consistency, we also 
allowed the threshold ratio to be scaled by its own best-
fitting value of k (i.e., VAVB = k∆
2
A /∆
2
B ). Hence all three 
models had a single free parameter.
Results
At a group level, both sets of observers had autism-trait 
scores close to previously published normative values 
(Experiment 1: M = 15.6, SD = 7.7; Experiment 2: M = 
15.2, SD = 8.1; cf. the findings of Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001: M = 16.4, SD = 6.3; also see trait vs. threshold scat-
terplots in Fig. S2 in the Supplemental Material). Before 
examining individual differences, we looked to see 
whether observers on average exhibited the expected 
lowering of perceived speed (Aubert-Fleischl phenome-
non and contrast effect) and appropriate differences in 
thresholds (pursuit > fixation in Experiment 1, and low 
contrast > high contrast in Experiment 2). Figure 3 shows 
the group effects for the psychophysical measurements. 
For both experiments, the mean ratio VA/VB that defined 
the motion phenomenon was significantly less than one. 
Experiment 1 therefore showed a significant Aubert-Fleischl 
phenomenon, one-sample t(30) = −12.20, p < .001; pur-
sued stimuli appeared to move more slowly than fixated 
stimuli. Further, Experiment 2 showed a significant con-
trast effect, one-sample t(25) = −7.22, p < .001; low-con-
trast stimuli appeared to move more slowly than 
high-contrast stimuli. At a group level, therefore, the per-
ceptual data replicated previous findings (Freeman et al., 
2010; Hürlimann et al., 2002; Sotiropoulos et al., 2014; 
Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Thompson, 1982).
The respective threshold differences were also in the 
direction predicted by the Bayesian framework: Pursuit 
thresholds were significantly greater than fixation thresh-
olds, t(30) = 4.97, p < .001, and low-contrast thresholds 
were significantly greater than high-contrast thresholds, 
t(25) = 2.68, p = .013. On average, therefore, the thresh-
old data show that the sensory evidence for motion dur-
ing pursuit and for lower contrasts is less reliable and so, 
according to Bayesian framework, culminates in a slow-
ing of perceived speed. The critical question of interest, 
however, is whether the individual differences in thresh-
olds can predict individual differences in the two motion 
phenomena when combined with systematic differences 
in the prior.
To examine this, we compared the size of each indi-
viduals’ measured Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon or con-
trast effect against the predictions made by the Bayesian 
model. The left column of Figure 4 shows the results for 
observers in each of the experiments. For comparison, 
reduced models based on either autism trait alone or sen-
sory evidence alone are also shown (the distributions of 
traits and relative sensory reliability can be seen by recall-
ing that the x-axes in these cases correspond to the trait 
scores and ratio of squared thresholds, respectively, both 
multiplied by a single scalar k). The dotted diagonal lines 
indicate a perfect fit. The Bayes model provided the 
best account of the data for both motion phenomena. 
The  differences between models were captured by the 
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root-mean-square errors (RMSEs) between predictions 
and data, the values of which are given in each panel. To 
investigate whether the numerical differences in RMSE 
were driven by outliers, we also calculated the mean 
absolute deviation, which avoids the squaring operation. 
In doing so, we found that the proportional differences 
between the Bayes model and reduced models actually 
increased.
The Bayes model is based on the assumption that the 
prior and sensory evidence are independent. To investi-
gate this assumption, we first examined the four possible 
correlations between autism trait and thresholds (see Fig. 
S2 in the Supplemental Material for associated scatter-
plots). Three were nonsignificant (lowest p = .53), with 
Bayes factors (BFs) favoring the null hypothesis (lowest 
BF01 = 3.71;
1 we assumed a flat prior for the correlation). 
The fourth correlation between autism trait and the low-
contrast threshold was also nonsignificant (p = .07), but 
the Bayes factor for this case neither favored the null nor 
experimental hypothesis (BF01 = 0.86). For Experiment 1, 
we also looked at the correlations between the trait mea-
sure and eye movement accuracy, because any relation-
ship between the two could act as an indirect link between 
the prior and the reliability of the sensory evidence. Nei-
ther correlation was significant (lowest p = .35). Our data 
therefore provide good support for key assumptions in 
the model.
In Experiment 1, the correlation between fixation 
threshold and fixation accuracy was significant, r(29) = 
−.38, p = .04. This potentially provides one reason why 
the sensory evidence associated with fixation varies 
across individuals. For instance, lower accuracy could 
mean an increase in fixation jitter, which implies that an 
observer was less able to hold his or her eyes stationary, 
so that greater external noise may be added to the stimu-
lus motion (O’Connor, Margrain, & Freeman, 2010). Note 
that differences in fixation accuracy could not affect the 
results of Experiment 2 because the stimuli used to study 
the contrast effect were shown simultaneously.
In summary, our results provide support for Pellicano 
and Burr’s (2012) flatter-prior hypothesis, as long as indi-
vidual differences in sensitivity are also taken into 
account. Our results further suggest that individual differ-
ences in the variance of the speed prior may be more 
systematic than previously thought.
Discussion
We investigated whether individual differences in per-
ception can be accounted for by a Bayesian model that 
combined individual differences in sensitivity with pre-
dictable individual differences in prior expectation. Our 
study was motivated by a need to unite two themes in 
the literature: a renewed interest in individual differences 
in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Kanai & Rees, 2011) and 
mounting evidence that the Bayesian framework pro-
vides a principled way to describe perception and cogni-
tion (e.g., Vilares & Kording, 2011). According to the 
Bayesian framework, noisy incoming evidence and prior 
expectations are optimally combined. Hence, individual 
differences should be a function of both. A key feature of 
our model was the idea that certain features of the prior 
may vary from one person to another in a systematic 
way. Specifically, inspired by Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) 
flatter-prior hypothesis, we examined whether the vari-
ance of the motion prior was a function of autistic traits. 
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These traits were combined with motion thresholds to 
predict individual differences in perceived speed using a 
quantitative Bayesian approach. The model fit the data 
well under two very different stimulus manipulations, 
one involving eye movement and the other involving 
contrast. Models based on autism traits or thresholds 
alone yielded much worse predictions.
One implication is that individual differences in prior 
and sensitivity could mask one another when perception 
between subpopulations is compared. This point is par-
ticularly relevant to the clinical literature (Dakin & Frith, 
2005; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Simmons et al., 2009; Teufel 
et al., 2015). For instance, in autism research, these differ-
ences have been traditionally attributed to either top-
down processes (e.g., Happé & Frith, 2006) or bottom-up 
processes (e.g., Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & 
Burack, 2006). The Bayesian framework can unify these 
two traditions; however, our results suggest that individual 
differences in both must be taken into account. One 
person with autism might show a different pattern of 
behavior than another person with autism despite having 
the same prior, simply because the two individuals differ 
in sensitivity. There is no straightforward mapping 
between autism (or prior) and perception and cognition 
because the relationship is confounded by variation in 
sensory information, and vice versa. This point may also 
explain the divergent findings in the autism literature, 
such as those surrounding the debate on susceptibility to 
visual illusions (Chouinard, Unwin, Landry, & Sperandio, 
2016; Simmons et al., 2009). But it also suggests that 
attributing the vagaries of perception in autism to either a 
flatter prior (Pellicano & Burr, 2012) or increased sensory 
precision (Brock, 2012) tells an incomplete story. Similar 
caution applies to other disorders to which Bayesian 
models have been applied (e.g., schizophrenia and 
depression) and to individual differences in general.
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Our findings suggest that some of the between-sub-
jects variation in priors may be more systematic than is 
implied in some formal Bayesian accounts. Specifically, 
the results suggests that the variance of the motion prior 
is influenced by the degree of autistic traits displayed by 
different individuals. However, this relationship is not 
necessarily exclusive—the model described here did not 
account for all the variance in the data, so other factors 
may contribute. For instance, we did not address any 
higher order aspects of the shape’s prior, just its spread; 
and we assumed that the likelihood is symmetric, an idea 
that has recently been challenged (Wei & Stocker, 2015). 
The model is also based on the assumption that the prior 
peaks at 0, a likely feature of the natural statistics of the 
motion world. But whether the internalized peak of the 
motion prior varies from person to person is an open 
question.
Why would sensory evidence and prior expectations 
differ across individuals? In terms of sensory evidence, 
these differences could be attributed to changes in the 
efficiency of neural coding, such as those known to exist 
in the tuning of low-level mechanisms (Edden et al., 
2009; Song et al., 2015). In terms of the prior, these dif-
ferences could be driven by individual differences in sen-
sitivity. However, we found no evidence that thresholds 
correlated with the trait measures, a finding that supports 
the independence of prior and threshold at the heart of 
the model. Further support comes from Beierholm, 
Quartz, and Shams (2009), who showed that testing dif-
ferent contrasts delivered in sessions separated by a week 
did not affect estimates of priors, just the likelihoods. It is 
therefore more likely that individual differences in priors 
arise from other factors, such as different experiences of 
the world or the ability to learn from them. Information 
about the statistics of the world is gathered from many 
different sources, and people are likely to have different 
exposures to these. Moreover, some individuals may be 
less able than others to integrate and internalize the 
statistics of the world, an idea that lies at the heart of 
Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) hypothesis. It remains to be 
seen whether differences in lifelong acquisition of prior 
knowledge extend to more short-term learning, such as 
the autism-trait-mediated changes in criterion shifts found 
by Skewes et al. (2015) and the continual updating and 
error monitoring that underlie predictive coding theories 
(Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013). It 
also remains to be seen whether the flatter-prior hypoth-
esis applies to priors in all areas. For example, Pell et al. 
(2016) recently found that the prior for gaze direction 
remains intact in individuals with ASD.
In conclusion, we applied the popular Bayesian 
approach to the study of individual differences in per-
ception. The results show that individual differences in 
priors and sensitivity must both be taken into account 
when explaining individual differences in perception. 
The underlying ideas presented here extend beyond per-
ception and may inform the application of Bayesian 
models to cognition and psychopathologies.
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Note
1. The subscript 01 indicates that the BF reflects the extent to 
which the values indexed are more likely to be obtained under the 
null hypothesis (H0) than under the alternative hypothesis (H1).
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